Reef fish that actively visit cleaner fish to have parasites and dead or infected tissue removed face two potential problems: they might have to wait while cleaners inspect other clients, and cleaners might feed on healthy body tissue, a behaviour that is referred to as cheating. Individuals of some 'client' species have large home ranges, which cover several cleaning stations, while others have small territories or home ranges with access to only one cleaning station. The former can thus choose between cleaners, while the latter cannot. We investigated whether clients with large home ranges change cleaning partners to outplay cleaners against each other to achieve (1) priority of access over clients with no choice at cleaning stations and (2) control over cheating by cleaners. We followed individuals of longnosed parrotfish, Hipposcarus harid, for up to 120 min in their natural environment and noted their interactions with cleaner wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus. Individuals were likely to return to the same cleaning station if the previous interaction had ended without conflict but changed cleaners for the next inspection if they had been either cheated or ignored, at least if the time between two consecutive visits was short. The overall attractiveness of a cleaning station seemed to be largely independent of service quality, which appeared to be similar at all stations. This is the first empirical evidence that the option to change partners is used as a control mechanism to stabilize cooperative behaviour.
Reef fish that actively visit cleaner fish to have parasites and dead or infected tissue removed face two potential problems: they might have to wait while cleaners inspect other clients, and cleaners might feed on healthy body tissue, a behaviour that is referred to as cheating. Individuals of some 'client' species have large home ranges, which cover several cleaning stations, while others have small territories or home ranges with access to only one cleaning station. The former can thus choose between cleaners, while the latter cannot. We investigated whether clients with large home ranges change cleaning partners to outplay cleaners against each other to achieve (1) priority of access over clients with no choice at cleaning stations and (2) control over cheating by cleaners. We followed individuals of longnosed parrotfish, Hipposcarus harid, for up to 120 min in their natural environment and noted their interactions with cleaner wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus. Individuals were likely to return to the same cleaning station if the previous interaction had ended without conflict but changed cleaners for the next inspection if they had been either cheated or ignored, at least if the time between two consecutive visits was short. The overall attractiveness of a cleaning station seemed to be largely independent of service quality, which appeared to be similar at all stations. This is the first empirical evidence that the option to change partners is used as a control mechanism to stabilize cooperative behaviour.
 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
Since its introduction by Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) , the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPD) has been used as a paradigm for the evolution of cooperation between unrelated individuals. In each round of the game, defecting yields a higher benefit than playing a cooperative strategy no matter what the partner does, but if both partners cooperate, they receive a higher payoff than if both defect. In the IPD, cooperative strategies can be evolutionarily stable because the repeated cooperative exploitation of a resource eventually overcomes the temptation for each partner to maximize its own payoff within each round. Dugatkin (1997) provides an overview of the various modifications theoreticians have made to develop the original model further.
The use of the IPD has been challenged for various reasons, however (Connor 1986; Noë 1990; Dugatkin et al. 1992; Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995) . Noë and colleagues (Noë et al. 1991; Noë & Hammerstein 1994) argued that cheating is often not an option for the players during cooperative interactions, as a single partner is not capable of achieving the goal by itself. Therefore, the IPD misses the more important question in these cases, namely how the payoff achieved from cooperation is split between partners (see also Bull & Rice 1991). For example, low-ranking male savannah baboons, Papio anubis, have to cooperate to chase a top-ranking male away from a female in oestrus. The obvious question then is which of the winners will go off with the female, and the payoff distribution among the cooperating males can be markedly asymmetrical (Noë 1990) . Noë et al. (1991) proposed that payoff asymmetries between cooperating animals are best understood by applying human market theory. In this scenario, the value of services, which animals trade with each other, depends on supply and demand for these services on the market. In the most extreme case, the so called 'veto game ' (Kahan & Rapoport 1984) , several players have only one potential partner available to gain access to a resource. This one 'veto player' can choose between its potential partners based on the amount they offer in return. The potential partners will therefore have to try to outbid each other to gain access to the veto player's resource, which will thus get the maximal value for its resource in a trade. 
